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Insurers' Liability for
Emotional Distress
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania National Mutual
Casualty Insurance Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. -,
396 A.2d 780 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, California introduced a revolutionary concept when the
Fourth District Court of Appeals held an insurer liable for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress for refusal to indemnify its
insured under a disability contract.' While it was unusual to rec-
ognize that tort for a breach of contract, the court went even fur-
ther by suggesting that "independent of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, such conduct on the part of a disa-
bility insurer constitutes a tortious interference with a protected
property interest of its insured for which damages may be recov-
ered .... *2 Three years later, the Supreme Court of California
adopted this suggestion by holding that a similar complaint stated
a cause of action in tort for breach of an insurer's implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
3
Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a lower
court's dismissal of an insured's cause of action which alleged that
denial of his insurance claim was "outrageous, malicious and op-
pressive... a willful, wanton and malicious tort .... -4 The per
curiam opinion in support of dismissal stated: "We cannot see how
a refusal by an insurance company to pay an $832.23 claim can jus-
tifiably give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of
mental distress or any other cause of action for mental distress."5
The dissenting opinion, however, urged that the insured had
1. Fletcher v. Western Natl Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
2. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
3. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
4. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 396
A.2d 780 (1978). (The order was affirmed because the judges were equally
divided).
5. Id. at -, 396 A.2d at 781.
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signed his insurance contract "for the peace of mind that if the...
injury should occur, his claim for. . . damage covered by the pol-
icy [would] be treated reasonably by the insurer."6 The dissent
went on to explain: "[Tiwo distinct causes of action in tort have
been recognized where the insurer refuses payment on a claim by
the insured: the first, an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; and the second, an action for breach of the insurer's
duty of good faith dealing."
'7
The following note will analyze D'Ambrosio and the evolution
of the doctrine of recovery for emotional distress caused by a
breach of contract.
II. FACTS
D'Ambrosio, a police officer, had insured his boat with th6 de-
fendant, Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Com-
pany. The complaint alleged that storm damages in the amount of
$832.23 were covered by the insurance policy and that plaintiff's
claim was not paid. Moreover, the defendant refused to explain
why the claim was refused and had insinuated that the plaintiff
was submitting a fraudulent claim. Plaintiff asserted that as a re-
sult he had "suffered severe emotional distress and undue worry
about his credit standing and professional reputation as a police
officer, and [had] been subjected to repeated demands for pay-
ment from the party who repaired the boat."8
The insurance company's demurrer to the complaint was sus-
tained by the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Delaware
County. Upon appeal, the equally-divided Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania affirmed the order.
I. HISTORY OF THE TORT
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is of rela-
tively recent origin. "Notwithstanding its early recognition in the
assault cases, the law has been slow to accept the interest in peace
of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even as against
intentional invasions."9 But "the law is clearly in a process of
growth, the ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be deter-
mined."1 0
The difficulty of proving or measuring damages is offered as a
6. Id. at -, 396 A.2d at 786.
7. Id. at -- 396 A.2d at 787.
8. Id. at -, 396 A.2d at 782.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49 (4th ed 1971) (em-
phasis added).
10. Id. at 50.
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reason for the great reluctance to redress mental distress." "But
mental suffering is scarcely more difficult of proof, and certainly no
harder to estimate in terms of money, than the physical pain of a
broken leg, which never has been denied compensation. .... -12
Others objected to the introduction of the tort for fear of a flood
of fictitious or trivial claims.13 Yet,
[i]t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at
the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incom-
petence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such
grounds.... [T] he elimination of trivialities calls for nothing more than
the same common sense which has distinguished serious from trifling in-
juries in other fields of the law.
14
The early cases required that the emotional distress be accom-
panied by an established tort, e.g., assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, or seduction.15 But eventually emotional distress was
recognized as a cause of action in itself, not simply 'parasitic"
damages.
16
The earliest appearance of anything like a separate cause of action...
was in cases holding a common carrier liable for insulting a passen-
ger ... [T] he later decisions rest the liability upon the special obligation
of the carrier to the public ....
The same liability has been imposed upon innkeepers, whose position
toward the public is analogous to that of carriers .... It has also been
extended in a few cases to telegraph companies; and there appears to be
little doubt that it would be applied to any other public utility .... 17
In recognition of the public character of the business of appor-
tioning and distributing losses from specified causes, state agen-
cies currently regulate the financial affairs, types of policies, and
business methods of insurance companies. Brokers and salesmen
are specially licensed in a further effort to protect individual mem-
bers of the public who have unequal bargaining power and are
subject to overreaching in the negotiation of an insurance contract.
Is there any reason that liability for emotional distress should not
be extended to insurers in view of their recognized position with
the public? Like common carriers, innkeepers, telegraph compa-
nies, and public utilities, insurance companies must assume the
extraordinary responsibility for faithful service to the public.18
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1031 (1956).
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 50 (footnote omitted).
15. "[I] t is generally held that there can be no recovery for mere profanity, ob-
scenity, or abuse .... The plaintiff cannot recover merely because he had
his feelings hurt." Id. at 54, 55.
16. Id. at 51-52.
17. Id. at 52-53.
18. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Neither Prosser 19 nor the Restatement of Torts,20 discusses this
tort in connection with the breach of a contract. However, the Re-
statement includes a caveat that "[t]he Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under
which the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or
reckless infliction of emotional distress."
'2 1
Breach of contract cases have been brought by attempting to fit
the claim into the "tort tailored" requirements of the Restatement.
Some recent attempts have been successful,2 2 while others have
failed.
23
IV. ACTIONS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
plaintiff must allege the following four elements: "(1) outrageous
conduct by defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress;
(3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;
and (4) actual and proximate causation of emotional distress by
the defendant's outrageous conduct."
24
In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,25 the insurer
was held liable in tort for damages caused by its refusal to indem-
nify its insured under a disability policy. The insured plaintiff had
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 9 at 54-55.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965):
§ 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress.
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is pres-
ent at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily
harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such dis-
tress results in bodily harm.
21. Id. at 72.
22. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Meiter
v. Cavanaugh, - Colo. App v. -, 580 P.2d 399 (1978); Agis v. Howard Johnson
Co., - Mass. -, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210
S.E.2d 145 (1974).
23. Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972). See
notes 55-61 & accompanying text infra.
24. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 395, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78,88 (1970) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (1970).
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purchased a disability insurance policy providing for payments of
$150 per month should he become totally disabled. The payments
were to continue for a maximum period of two years if insured be-
came disabled because of sickness, thirty years if from injury.
While he was at work lifting a heavy bale of rubber, he injured his
back. Following surgery for a hernia, he returned to work but con-
tinued to have trouble with his back until he was placed on disabil-
ity by his physician and terminated by his employer a few weeks
later. Numerous doctors examined and treated him after he filed
for workmen's compensation, and they all agreed that he was dis-
abled due to the accidental injury to his back.2 6 Despite the fact
that virtually all these reports reached the insurance company, it
refused to pay its insured under the injury provision which set
forth a thirty-year liability period,27 but instead insisted on pay-
ment under the sickness provision having only a two-year period.2 8
The insurer's own investigation had established that plaintiff's dis-
ability was a result of an injury.29 The insurance company origi-
nally sought to avoid liability by claining the insured had made a
material misrepresentation in his application for insurance,3 0 and
later attempted to "force" the insured into a settlement at an
amount far less than the potential claim.
3 1
In upholding awards for compensatory and punitive damages,
the California court stated that while an insurance company is
privileged to assert its legal rights even though doing so would
cause emotional distress, it must do so "in a permissible way and
with a good-faith belief in the existence of the rights asserted....
Severe emotional distress means ... emotional distress of such
substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in
a civilized society should be expected to endure it."' 32 It "may con-
sist of any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as fright, grief,
shame, humiliation, embarassment, anger, chagrin, disappoint-
ment or worry."33 "[D]uration of the emotional distress is one
[factor] to be considered in determining its severity."34 Moreover,
"' [i t is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe
emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine
26. Id. at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
27. Id. at 388, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
30. Id. at 390, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
31. Id., 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85-86.
32. Id. at 395, 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89, 90.
33. Id., 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
34. Id. at 398, 89 CaL Rptr. at 91.
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whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.' "3
The Fletcher court then went on to say that "[aIn insurer owes
to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of the benefits of the
policy. Violation of that duty sounds in tort notwithstanding that it
also constitutes a breach of contract. ' 36 This duty of good faith im-
poses upon the insurer the "duty not to withhold ... payments,
maliciously and without probable cause, for the purpose of injur-
ing the insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy."
37
"To some extent [the special duties] take cognizance of the great
disparity in the economic situations and bargaining abilities of the
insurer and the insured."
While the court held the insurer liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, it also introduced the possibility of a sepa-
rate, second cause of action for breach of the insurer's contractual
duty of good faith dealing. The conduct of the insurer was held to
constitute "tortious interference with a protected property interest
* . . for which damages [could] be recovered to compensate for all
detriment proximately resulting therefrom, including economic
loss ... and, in a proper case, punitive damages.
'39
V. THE NEW TORT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Three years later, the Supreme Court of California in
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,40 held that a complaint of an
insured sufficiently alleged a breach of the insurers' duty of good
faith and fair dealing which they owed the insured, and that dam-
ages could be awarded for mental distress without a showing that
the plaintiff had suffered severe emotional distress or substantial
damages therefrom where the plaintiff had sustained substantial
property damage. In Gruenberg, three insurers denied payment of
fire policies to the insured plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged bad faith
and outrageous conduct by the insurers who acted in concert to
falsely imply that the plaintiff was guilty of arson, thereby attempt-
ing to establish grounds for avoiding payment. The defendants
had stated to an arson investigator that Gruenberg had acquired
excessive fire insurance, and while criminal charges of arson were
pending against the plaintiff, they demanded that the plaintiff sub-
mit to certain examinations which were required under the poli-
35. Id. at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment j (1965)).
36. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
39. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
40. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal Rptr. 480 (1973).
1172 [Vol. 58:1167
INSURERS' LIABILITY
cies. Additionally, one of their claims adjusters appeared as a
witness for the state at the preliminary hearing on the felony com-
plaint. The criminal charges against the plaintiff were dismissed
for lack of probable cause, and the plaintiff thereafter initiated a
cause of action against the insurance companies stating that "as a
'direct and proximate result of the outrageous conduct and bad
faith of the defendants,' plaintiff suffered 'severe economic dam-
age,' 'severe emotional upset and distress,' loss of earnings and
various special damages."4 1 The Superior Court of Los Angeles
County dismissed Gruenberg's complaint.
Upon appeal from the dismissal, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that the complaint of the insured had alleged a breach of
the insurers' implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which they
owed the insured-a cause of action in tort.42 The insurers argued
that the plaintiff could not recover, as a matter of law, because he
had not alleged "conduct which [was] 'extreme' and 'outra-
geous.' 43 The court, however, concluded that "since plaintiff...
alleged substantial damages for loss of property apart from dam-
ages for mental distress, the complaint [was] sufficiently pleaded
with respect to the latter element of damages."'' The theory of re-
covery here was "totally distinct" from that used in Fletcher which
was "predicated on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress alone. ' 45 Thus the court recognized a new mental distress
tort for breach of the insurer's duty of good faith dealing.
Prior to Gruenberg, courts outside California had hinted at this
theory, but those decisions were based upon the older theory re-
quiring proof of outrageous conduct and extreme emotional dis-
tress. 46 For instance, in Eckenroder v. Life of America Insurance
Co.,47 the court held that allegations by a wife that Life of America
Insurance Company's repeated and outrageous refusal to make
payment to her as beneficiary of her husband's life policy which
caused her "to suffer 'severe distress and disturbance of [her]
mental tranquility,' " sufficiently stated a cause of action. The
outrageous conduct alleged was refusal of payment with knowl-
edge by the insurer of the decedent's accidental death and "eco-
nomic coercion" to force her to "compromise" her claim.49
41. Id. at 572, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
42. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
43. Id. at 579, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
44. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
45. Id.
46. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Amsden v.
Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972).
47. 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
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Decedent left plaintiff with several children, but no property of value. She
had no money, none even for the funeral expenses. Denied payment by
Insurer, she was required to borrow money to support her family, while
her financial condition worsened. The family was required to live with,
and accept charity from, relatives.
50
The court found that the alleged conduct "clearly [rose] to the
level of 'outrageous conduct' to a person of 'ordinary sensibili-
ties.' "51 It recognized that "[tIhe very risks insured against pre-
suppose that upon the death of the insured the beneficiary might
be in difficult circumstances .... 52 And, the court noted that "in-
surance contracts are subject to the same implied conditions of
good faith and fair dealing as are other contracts."5' 3 "We think it is
clear that an action of the type involved here sounds both in con-
tract and in tort.
'54
While the Supreme Court of Iowa also stated that violation of
the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort
and breach of contract, it too held, in Amsden v. Grinnell Mutual
Reinsurance Co.,55 that outrageous conduct and extreme emo-
tional distress-pre-Gruenberg requirements-were among the el-
ements that had to be proven. Here, the directed verdict for
defendant insurers was upheld "because [the] plaintiff ... wholly
failed to prove it."'56 Fire had destroyed the contents of plaintiff's
enterprise in October, 1969, and "[t]he state fire marshall con-
cluded the fire was the work of an arsonist and undertook an inves-
tigation. Plaintiff himself was among those investigated .... The
fire marshall's investigation cleared plaintiff of any responsibility
for the fire in February 1970. The loss was settled and paid July 31,
1970."57
Despite the fact that it had taken nine months to make any pay-
ment on the claim, the court concluded that "[tI he facts presented
in the appeal before us do not even begin to approach outrageous
conduct. '5 8 They excused the delay by saying that it was not im-
proper for the insurance company to wait a reasonable period for
an arson investigation of the insured, that much of the delay oc-
curred because neither the insured nor the insurer knew the
amount of the loss,59 and that a sixty-day delay in payment after
the insured and insurer agreed on the amount of the loss was not
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5 n.4.
55. 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972).
56. Id. at 253.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 255.
59. Id.
1174 [Vol. 58:1167
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unreasonable.60 One may wonder what the result would have
been if the court had recognized the tort of mental distress based
upon a breach of the insurer's implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing as set forth in Gruenberg6' six months later.
Six months after Gruenberg, the Supreme Court of Virginia
again recognized only the older cause of action, requiring extreme
and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress. In this
tort action, it reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiff by holding
that the trial court erred in its holding that no recovery could be
given for emotional distress in the absence of physical damage or
other bodily harm.62 This result should be expected since "[in
1948 a section of the Restatement of Torts was amended to reject
any absolute necessity for physical results. '63 Still, Virginia has
not yet adopted the separate, newer cause of action for mental dis-
tress caused by breach of the insurer's duty of good faith dealing
recognized in Fletcher64 and Gruenberg.65
The same issue was decided by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.,66 a decision which empha-
sized that the doctrine of recovery for the mental distress caused
by a breach of contract was a novel concept. The trial court had
dismissed a mental anguish complaint of a former Howard John-
son employee for being summarily fired. The complaint did not
allege any resulting bodily injury. Without considering the claim
as one for breach of the contract-implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the appellate court updated the trial court's decision by
not requiring that bodily harm be demonstrated. However, it
failed to take the second step of recognizing the newer, separate
tort, based upon the breach of a contractual duty. The court still
insisted upon proof "that the conduct was 'extreme and outra-
geous,' . . . [and] that the emotional distress sustained by the
plaintiff was 'severe.' "67
Another approach to the same result (liability of the insurer)
was recently taken by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Meiter v.
Cavanaugh.68 While refusing to recognize the newer tort, the
court held that the determination of whether the defendant's con-
60. Id. at 253.
61. 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1973).
62. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 50.
64. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
65. 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1973).
66. - Mass. -, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
67. Id. at -, 355 N.E.2d at 319 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965)).
68. - Colo. -, 580 P.2d 399 (1978).
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duct was "outrageous" should be for the jury.69 In Meiter the
plaintiff had purchased defendant's house so that her grandchil-
dren and recently widowed daughter-in-law could live in it. The
defendant refused to surrender possession of the house at the time
appointed in the contract, threatened the plaintiff with legal action
while implying special influence with the court, and called her a
"sick old woman" while she was bandaged following recent cancer
surgery.7 0 The defendant vacated the premises approximately one
and one-half months following the contracted date.
7 1
Although the Supreme Court of Iowa determined that nine
months to make payment on an insurance contract claim was not
outrageous,7 2 the Colorado court held that abusive conduct in addi-
tion to a month and one-half delay in vacating a purchased resi-
dence presented a jury question regarding its outrageousness.
"The question of whether certain conduct is sufficiently outra-
geous is ordinarily a question for the jury."
73
The antiquity of this area of the law in some jurisdictions was
also demonstrated in Sheltra v. Smith.74 The "independent cause
of action [of] outrageous conduct causing severe emotional dis-
tress . . . has not previously been recognized in Vermont. Ver-
mont jurisprudence has recognized that mental distress caused by
negligent acts resulting in physical injuries is actionable. '75 In
this non-contract, tort action, the Supreme Court of Vermont re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, holding
that the cause of action could be maintained despite the absence of
physical injuries.
While some states remain reluctant to recognize mental dis-
tress without physical injuries, California departed from such re-
quirements where there were accompanying property injuries by
1945,76 and expanded property injury to include pecuniary losses
by 1967.77 In Thompson v. Simonds,78 the court held that it could
not say that a $1000 damage award was excessive for '"pain, anxi-
ety, inconvenience, annoyance, interference with the comfort of
plaintiff and his family, and disadvantage suffered by reason of a
69. Id. at 401. Presumably, the jury would also decide whether the distress was
"severe."
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id.
72. 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972).
73. 580 P.2d at 401.
74. - Vt. -- 392 A.2d 431 (1978).
75. Id. at -, 392 A.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
76. Thompson v. Simonds, 68 Cal. App. 2d 151, 162, 155 P.2d 870, 876 (1945).
77. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434-36, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 19 (1967).
78. 68 Cal. App. 2d 151, 155 P.2d 870 (1945).
1176 [Vol. 58:1167
INSURERS' LIABILITY
defendant's acts. '79 The evidence showed that the defendant had
diverted plaintiff's domestic water supply through a horse trough,
had piped water from an iron spring into the plaintiff's line so that
it stained the plaintiff's washing and fixtures, and occasionally had
totally disrupted the flow of spring water used by the plaintiff to
wash his prune crop.
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,80 which preceded Fletcher8 l by
three years, held that conduct producing substantial pecuniary
damages, and in turn mental distress, was "tortious conduct result-
ing in substantial invasions of clearly protected interests. '82 But,
the court stated it was not "concerned with the problem whether
invasion of the plaintiff's right to be free from emotional distur-
bance is actionable where there is no injury to person or property
rights in addition to the inflicted mental distress. 83 A decision on
whether mental distress is actionable without a showing of sub-
stantial physical injury or property damage in a tort action against
an insurance company for breach of the contract duty of good faith
dealing is yet to be made. In the context of breach by refusal to
pay a legitimate claim, the question is not applicable since there
are pecuniary losses involved.
While Crisci concerned the settlement of a third party's claim
against the insured, Fletcher subsequently introduced the liability
for refusal to indemnify the insured's claim. Since Gruenberg has
refined the new tort in its application to insureds' claims, it would
appear to apply as well to mental distress of the insured occa-
sioned by the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle third-party
claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mental distress has progressed from reluctant recognition as a
"parasite" accompanying previously recognized torts, to an in-
79. Id. at 162, 155 P.2d at 875.
80. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
81. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
82. 66 Cal. 2d at 434,426 P.2d at 179,58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Tenant of the insured sued
for $400,000 when an outside wooden staircase tread gave way, she fell
through up to her waist, and was left hanging 15 feet above the ground. The
insurer refused to settle for $9,000 after being advised that the tenant's award
would be at least $100,000 and that psychiatrists were divided as to whether
the fall caused her psychosis. The landlord's liability policy was for $10,000.
After the adverse judgment in tenant's action against the insured, the in-
sured became indigent, developed hysteria, suffered a decline in health, and
attempted suicide. The Supreme Court of California held that the insured
was entitled to recover the difference between the policy limit and the
amount of the judgment and $25,000 for mental suffering.
83. Id. at 434 n.4, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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dependent cause of action which may itself support another
claim. 84 Mental distress has been recognized primarily as a tort,
but recently also as a tort based on a breach of contract action.85
From its recognition as a breach of contract action, a separate
cause of action in tort has sprung forth for breach of an insurer's
implied duty of good faith dealing.
86
As the D'Ambrosio case demonstrates, despite this progress,
some jurisdictions still refuse to allow causes of action for emo-
tional distress caused by breach of contract. Is the denial, for in-
stance, of the sum of $832.23 so insignificant that it cannot cause
emotional distress? Or, is it likely that, given the opportunity, a
jury might reasonably decide that denying $832.23 to a person liv-
ing on a policeman's salary would be sufficient to cause mental dis-
tress? Having purchased insurance against such a loss, did not
both the insured and the insurer consider such a loss significant?
And, was it not "peace of mind" that prompted the plaintiff to seek
insurance? If insurers are selling "peace of mind," why when they
breach their contracts should the injured insureds not be compen-
sated?
An original fear of the tort of mental distress was that damages
were difficult to assess and prove and therefore a "flood of fictitious
and trivial claims might result if an independent tort were recog-
nized."87 But this is insufficient reason to deny such claims, be-
cause as Prosser noted, "[i]t is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,'
and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief on such grounds.
'88
Liability for mental distress has been applied to common carri-
ers, innkeepers, telegraph companies, and public utilities because
of their special responsibilities owed the public.89 Each industry
contracts with individuals on its own terms, or its rates are con-
trolled by governmental overseers so that the individual customer
has little, if any, bargaining power regarding the terms of the con-
tract. At the same time, each industry is held to a high duty of
service to the public because it affects the lives, directly and indi-
rectly, of nearly every person in the wide community served. In-
84. - Mass. at -, 355 N.E.2d at 320. (Spouse of the distressed plaintiff also enti-
tled to maintain an action for loss of consortium).
85. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Amsden
v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1973).
86. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
87. - Vt. at -, 392 A.2d 431, 432 (1978).
88. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 51.
89. Id. at 53.
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surers also have a recognized significant public responsibility for
similar reasons.90 Is there any valid reason to exclude insurance
companies from liability for mental distress brought on by denying
the service rightfully expected?
Of course the insurance companies may validly assert any legit-
imate defense to a claim they may have. But "when the i'surer
unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of
its insured, it is subject to liability in tort."91 And as the court
noted in DAmbrosio:
Thus in Gruenberg, the California Supreme Court saw the creation of
tort liability for the breach of good faith as a natural outgrowth of a long
standing policy that insurers must deal fairly with their insureds; the duty
to accept reasonable settlements and the duty to act reasonably in han-
dling claims were merely aspects of the same general duty of good faith
and fair dealing.92
... This requirement rests in part on the recognition both that insur-
ance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and that the insured at the time
of the claim may be in unfortunate circumstances .... 93
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the in-
sured must prove that the insurer's conduct was outrageous; but to re-
cover for breach of the insurer's duty of good faith dealingthe insured
need only prove that the insurer's action was in bad faith.v
Leland B. Jones '80
90. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972).
91. 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
92. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 396 A.2d at 784-85.
93. Id. at -, 396 A.2d at 785-86 (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at-, 396 A.2d at 787.
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